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Abstract
Voters sometimes vote for seemingly less qualified candidates. To explain this fact,
we develop a model in which a voter elects a politician among candidates with dierent
competence (valence) levels, considering that the future accountability of elected candi-
dates depends on their competence levels. We show the condition under which politi-
cians’ competence relates negatively with accountability. When this negative relation
exists, voters prefer to elect an incompetent candidate if they emphasize politicians’ pol-
icy choices over their competence. We also highlight voters’ private information about
how they evaluate candidates’ competence, showing that voters’ anti-elitism can be a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
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1 Introduction
Candidates regarded by voters as less competent have won several elections, and voters’
preference for incompetent politicians has been remarkable in recent years. For example, a
survey by Di Tella and Rotemberg (2018) shows that in the 2016 U.S. presidential election,
citizens elected Donald Trump knowing that Trump did not understand policies compared
with Hillary Clinton. In the survey conducted before the election, only 12 % of subjects
agreed that Trump understands policies more than Clinton, while 65% of subjects agreed
that Clinton understands policies more than Trump. Furthermore, considering past political
career, Trump did not have any elective experience, while Clinton had held a senate seat
for eight years and had served as Secretary of State for four years. The 2016 presidential
election is not an exceptional case; when we measure candidates’ political experience by
past career as a senator, a governor, or vice-president, U.S. voters have consistently elected
less-experienced candidates in presidential elections since 1996 (Rauch 2015). The electoral
surge of Five Star Movement in Italy, led by the comedian Beppe Grillo, also illustrates the
rise of amateur politicians. On the back of repeated corruption scandals, Five Star Movement
criticized existing politicians, and “[i]n this framework, political inexperience is considered a
strength rather than a weakness" (Mosca 2014, p. 44). Dustmann et al. (2017) also argue that
the erosion of trust in existing politicians and political institutions causes the rise of populist
parties, which are generally new and inexperienced.
Existing theories provide the reason why incompetent individuals can hold political of-
fices in a democracy, but their explanation focuses on the entry of individuals into politics
(Caselli and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo 2015; Besley et
al. 2017).1 Although the entry side of political selection is important, the above examples
illustrate that voters do not always elect the most competent candidate among the pool of
candidates in an election, which means that the quality of a politician in an oce can be low
even if high quality individuals have incentives to run for oce.
This paper aims to show theoretically why and when voters elect a less competent can-
didate, by focusing on the mechanism by which voters’ demand for incompetent politicians
emerges from the relationship between competence and accountability. To this end, we ex-
tend a two-period political agency model a la Besley (2006), incorporating the following key
structures: (i) politicians dier in observable competence levels, in addition to unobservable
policy preferences and (ii) an open seat election is introduced before the first policy choice to
1Competent individuals may be less likely to run for oce due to their high opportunity cost of being
politicians (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004). Political parties might recruit mediocre
individuals to maximize party members’ incentives to exert eort for the party (Mattozzi and Merlo 2015) or to
secure a leader’s survival, which would be threatened by the entry of competent individuals (Besley et al. 2017).
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determine the incumbent’s competence level. Specifically, a competent and an incompetent
candidate contest the first election. After choosing a policy, the winner contests with a new
challenger, and the winner of the second election again chooses a policy. The voters’ payos
depend on the competence levels of the elected politicians and the chosen policies. As in
Besley (2006), the voters cannot observe the politicians’ policy preferences, and the politi-
cians’ policy compromise to the voters can be a signal of shared preferences, which increases
their probability of re-election.
We show that politicians’ incentive to cater to voters’ policy preferences can be inversely
related to their competence levels; due to this negative relation between competence and ac-
countability, voters prefer the incompetent candidate if they place emphasis on accountability.
The reason behind the negative relation between competence and political representation is
that voters cannot commit to the future re-election strategies. For example, when the incum-
bent is less competent than the challenger, the voters may elect the challenger even though
the incumbent has chosen the voters’ preferred policy. Similarly, when the incumbent is more
competent than the challenger, the voters may re-elect the incumbent even though the incum-
bent has not chosen the voters’ preferred policy. As a result, when the future challenger is
unlikely to be competent, the incompetent incumbent has an incentive to act in the voters’
interest, while the competent incumbent does not. In the open seat election in the first period,
the voters cast their ballots considering these politicians’ incentives. Hence, when the neg-
ative relation between competence and accountability is expected, the voters prefer to elect
the incompetent candidate if they emphasize the policy choice of the elected politicians rather
than their competence.
The model also incorporates that voters have private information about how much weight
they give to the politicians’ competence. Specifically, one type of voter (type-C) gives the
highest priority to the candidates’ competence and always votes for a candidate with the
highest competence level, while the other type (type-P) places lower priority on competence
and weighs the candidates’ competence against their expected policy choices to decide who
to vote for.
This voters’ private information generates a complementary mechanism leading to the
negative relation between the politicians’ competence and their representation of the voters’
preferences. To explain this result, assume that the voters, who are identical and are treated
as a single player, adopt the following separating strategy: the type-C voters elect the com-
petent candidate, while the type-P voters elect the incompetent candidate. Then, the winning
candidate can identify the voters’ type from the electoral result; after winning, the competent
candidate perceives that the voters are type-C and place the maximum value on his or her
competence. As a result, the competent candidate will pursue his or her own interest, sac-
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rificing the voters’ interest, in the policy choice stage because of the perception that his or
her advantage derived from competence will dominate the next election. Given this policy
choice, it can be optimal for the type-P voters to elect the incompetent candidate if they place
suciently great importance on the policy choice.2 Then, the voters’ separating strategy
assumed in the first place becomes optimal.
This self-fulfilling mechanism implies that the voters’ anti-elitism can be rational ex post
even if it is groundless in the first place. When voters mistrust the policy choice of elite
politicians for some reasons, allowing these politicians to win makes them perceive that they
can win because the voters highly evaluate their high level of competence. Since this per-
ception undermines politicians’ accountability, it becomes rational for voters to distrust elite
politicians. The economic downturn since the financial crisis in 2008 is often said to be the
cause of the rise of anti-establishment parties in Europe (Algan et al. 2017; Dustmann et al.
2017; Guiso et al. 2017), but it is not obvious whether existing politicians are responsible
for the economic downturn. Our model explains why it is dicult to dispel voters’ distrust
against existing politicians even though this distrust emerges from baseless suspicion.
Our model also yields several empirical predictions. First, incompetent candidates are
more likely to be elected when a sharp policy conflict exists between the decisive voters and
other citizens. When policy conflict is severe, voters’ policy payos vary greatly depending
on whether their preferred policy is chosen or not. In this situation, voters care much about
policy choice, which makes the election of incompetent candidates more likely. This theo-
retical prediction is a possible explanation for why U.S. voters have consistently elected less
experienced candidates as their presidents since mid-1990s. The recent progress of global-
ization has intensified policy conflicts around trade and immigration, and these are often said
to be the cause of Trump’s win in the 2016 election. The second prediction is that compe-
tent candidates are more likely to win in the case where the expected quality of the future
challenger is high. This is because the entry of a competent challenger enhances the ac-
countability of the competent incumbent but undermines that of the incompetent incumbent.
The third prediction is that the eects of term limit on politicians’ behavior depend on their
competence. In the separating equilibrium, the incompetent politician has an incentive to
compromise to voters for re-election, while the competent politician does not. Hence, the
incompetent politician is more likely to change policies in the last term where he or she does
not need to seek re-election. Finally, we predict that the incompetent politician is less likely
to be elected when the reward for the politician is large enough. When the reward is large
enough, politicians in oce choose voters’ preferred policy to get re-elected regardless of
2For the voters to elect the incompetent candidate, it is necessary that the incompetent politician has an
incentive to compromise to voters, which is assured when the future challenger is less likely to be competent.
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their competence levels, which eliminates the behavioral dierence between competent and
incompetent politicians. Thus, voters elect competent candidates in this case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section relates this paper to the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the environment of the model, and Section 4 solves
it. Section 5 discusses the empirical predictions of the model. Section 6 empirically tests the
prediction of the term-limit eect. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
The model of this paper is related to the political agency models with hidden types of politi-
cians (Rogo 1990; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Besley and Case 1995a; Coate and Morris
1995; Besley 2006; Besley and Smart 2007).3 As is described in Introduction, this paper is
dierent from these studies in the following three ways: (i) politicians dier in observable
competence levels, in addition to unobservable types, (ii) an open seat election is introduced
before the first policy choice to determine the incumbent’s competence level, and (iii) voters
have private information. The open seat election is introduced to analyze the voters’ choice
of the candidates’ competence. The voters’ private information generates the interaction be-
tween their voting strategies and the incumbent’s accountability. The extension in the first
way is also analyzed by Padró i Miquel and Snowberg (2012). Incorporating politicians’
valence into a political agency model, they analyze whether the re-nomination decision by
party members promotes the political accountability of the incumbent to his or her party. The
mechanism in our model through which the voters’ commitment problem generates the nega-
tive relation between competence and accountability is similar to their argument.4 However,
unlike their model, the voters have private information about how they emphasize the politi-
cians’ competence, and the incumbent’s belief about the voters’ type aects the incumbent’s
tradeo between rent-seeking and re-election. Furthermore, this study analyzes politicians’
accountability to general voters rather than their party members, and our primary interests are
to analyze voters’ preference for incompetent candidates, considering that the future electoral
accountability of elected candidates depends on their competence levels.
There are several studies that analyze when voters demand incompetent politicians (Buis-
seret and Prato 2016; Buisseret and Van Weelden 2017; Di Tella and Rotemberg 2018; Eguia
and Giovannoni 2019; Kishishita 2017; Mattozzi and Snowberg 2018).5 While most of these
3The pioneering work on political agency has been done by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Austen-
Smith and Banks (1989).
4Another strand of literature on political accountability indicates voters’ commitment problem in the context
of an infinite-horizon model with term limits (see Bernhardt et al. (2004) and Duggan and Martinelli (2017).
5Demand for incompetent politicians is related to populism. Populism contains citizens’ anti-elitism as an
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studies assume that competent candidates have some innate dierences from incompetent
candidates besides competence, this paper shows that voters prefer a less competent candi-
date in an election even if candidates’ characteristics are identical, except for their compe-
tence, from the voters’ perspective. In this sense, Buisseret and Prato (2016) is the closest
to this study; they show why candidates’ incompetence in itself can be beneficial to voters.
They provide a model in which politicians use their time to serve voters in their constituency
or to achieve benefits for their faction in the legislature. They show that the strategic comple-
mentarity in politicians’ factional activities makes it dicult for voters to control politicians
as their quality rises. Since the strategic interdependency among politicians, who are elected
from dierent districts, is the key to the mechanism, the focus of Buisseret and Prato (2016)
is on politicians in legislatures. On the other hand, the mechanism proposed in this paper
shows that the negative relation between competence and accountability can occur in the
environment where voters elect a single policy maker.
This paper also relates to the literature on the role of candidates’ valence in electoral com-
petition. Most existing studies, using the standard Hotelling-Downs model where candidates
can commit to campaign promises, have investigated the eects of candidates’ valence on
platform divergence in electoral competition. (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose
2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002; Kartik and McAfee 2007; Callander 2008; Carrillo and
Castanheira 2008; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2009; Aragones and Xefteris 2017).
Among these studies, Aragones and Xefteris (2017) is similar to this paper in that voters’
evaluation about candidates’ valence is their private information. However, in their envi-
ronment following the standard Hotelling-Downs model, voters cannot send any informative
signals to candidates.
In this literature, this paper is most closely related to Bernhardt et al. (2011), who build
a model with repeated elections where incumbent politicians, who cannot commit to policies
before being elected, face a tradeo between their own preferred policy and policy compro-
mise toward voters to get re-elected. Unlike this paper, they assume that voters can observe
politicians’ valence only after they are elected,6 and show that incumbents with valence ad-
important aspect, and populist parties generally lack political experience. Thus, this paper is also related with
recent studies on populism (see, among others, Acemoglu et al. 2013; Algan et al. 2017; Dustmann 2017;
Guiso et al. 2017; Karakas and Mitra 2017). Karakas and Mitra (2017) argue that ideological extremism allows
outsider candidates to commit to radical policy shifts more credibly than establishment candidates and that
this commitment ability originating in outsiders’ extremism is the reason why outsider candidates can obtain
voters’ support. This paper provides another reason why outsider candidates can commit to policies preferred by
voters: the incompetence that results from the inexperience of outsider candidates makes themmore accountable
to voters than establishment candidates, who are experienced and are considered as competent.
6Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) also analyze the model where candidates cannot commit to policies before
elections and have private information about their valence characteristics.
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vantage are more likely to deviate from their preferred policy for getting re-elected.7
Finally, this paper is related to the literature focusing on the signaling function of voting
(Piketty 2000; Castanheira 2003; Razin 2003; Meirowitz 2005; Shotts 2006; Meirowitz and
Tucker 2007; Meirowitz and Shotts 2009; Hummel 2011; Kselman and Niou 2011; McMur-
ray 2017; Myatt 2017).8 The models in these studies analyze the situation in which candi-
dates learn about voters’ private information from electoral results. However, none of these
studies have analyzed how voters’ private information aects the political accountability of
incumbent politicians.9
3 The model
3.1 Environment
Our model has two time periods (t = 1;2), and all agents discount the future with a common
discount factor  2 (0;1). A group of identical citizens has a majority and chooses a policy
maker in an election in each period. The elected politician chooses a policy et 2 f0;1g, and
the majority prefer et = 1 to et = 0. They obtain v > 0 if et = 1 and obtain nothing if et = 0.
As in Besley (2006), policy preferences divide electoral candidates into two types: con-
gruent and dissonant types. The policy preferences of the dissonant type conflict with the
majority. The dissonant type obtains private benefit r > 0 by choosing et = 0, and obtains
nothing by choosing et = 1. The policy preferences of the congruent type coincide with the
majority, and this type always chooses et = 1. The type of a candidate is his or her private
information, and the prior probability that a candidate is the congruent type is  2 (0;1).
This set-up encompasses many situations. One interpretation is that the policy preferences
of dissonant politicians dier from those of the majority because the dissonant politicians
represent an organized minority group, such as the elite whose policy preferences conflict
with the majority. In this interpretation, there is conflict between the majority and some
minority groups of citizens over policies. The minority group attempts to influence policies
by means such as lobbying and political donation, but only dissonant politicians are receptive
to the oer by the minority group. Another interpretation is that congruent and dissonant
7We will explain in more detail the dierence between this paper and Bernhard et al. (2011) after we present
our results (see Section 5.3).
8Callander and Wilkie (2007), Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Callander (2008) provide models in which
candidates send signals on their valence characteristics to voters.
9Among these studies, the motivation of this paper is related to the studies of protest voting by Kselman and
Niou (2011) and Myatt (2017). However, our model is based on the political agency model and its structure is
quite dierent from those of their models.
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types represent candidates’ honesty. Honest politicians always prefer honest behavior, but
dishonest politicians who choose honest behavior incur loss from passing up dishonest profit.
Competence is another dimension of candidates’ heterogeneity. Electoral candidates are
either competent (i = H) or incompetent(i = L). Competent candidates can provide voters
with additional payos if elected. In the payo structure of the majority, this valence compo-
nent is additively separable from the payo from the policy choice et , which is the standard
formulation in the literature of candidates’ valence and electoral competition (see, among
others, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000, Groseclose 2001, and Aragones and Xefteris 2017).
Voters can observe candidates’ competence by observing their past experiences in political
oces, careers in the private sector, educational achievement, and so on. We assume that can-
didates’ types are not correlated with their competence; the prior probability of a candidate
being the congruent type is independent of the competence of the candidate.
The majority have a subjective evaluation on how politicians’ competence will increase
their payo, and this evaluation is the majority’s private information. Specifically, there are
two types of majority. When the majority is competence–oriented (hereinafter called type-
C), they give the highest priority to candidates’ competence when choosing a politician: the
payo from competence is suciently high that the majority of this type have lexicographic
preferences over candidates. In this case, the majority always prefer the competent candidate
to the incompetent one. On the other hand, if the majority assign more importance to politi-
cians’ policy choice, their voting decision will be aected by candidates’ expected policy
choice. If this is the case, we say that the majority is policy–oriented or type-P. The type-P
majority obtain  > 0 from electing a competent candidate. For notational simplicity, we
define vˆ  v=. The type of the majority is determined by the nature. In the beginning of the
first period, the nature chooses the type of the majority; the majority are type-C with proba-
bility  2 (0;1) and are type-P with probability 1   . We will discuss the case of  = 0 in
Section 4.5, in which the majority have no private information and are certainly type-P.
In the election in the first period, a competent and an incompetent candidate run for oce,
and the winner chooses a policy e1. In the second-period election, the incumbent politician
contests with a challenger who is competent with probability q 2 (0;1) and is incompe-
tent with probability 1   q. This environment diers from standard political agency models,
where an incumbent policy maker is randomly drawn at the beginning. We modify this stan-
dard setup to analyze the choice of voters who elect a candidate, considering that the future
electoral accountability of elected candidates depends on their heterogeneous characteristics.
This environment is possibly the simplest way to analyze the problem. It allows us to accom-
plish our purpose, which is to show why and when voters elect less competent candidates.
The elected candidates obtain W > 0 in both elections. Since the model ends at the
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A competent and an incompetent 
candidate run for an election.
Nature draws the types.
The first election
Period 1 Period 2
Policy choice Entry of a challenger
The second election
Policy choice
Figure 1: The timing of events
second period, the candidate elected in the second election can choose his or her preferred
policy without considering re-election. Hence, a dissonant candidate can obtain R  W + r
by winning the second election. We assume that R > r . If this assumption does not hold,
the dissonant type always chooses e1 = 0.
We assume that the majority re-elect the incumbent if the incumbent is identical with
the challenger in terms of both the perceived probability of being congruent and the level of
competence. We also assume that all agents do not play weakly dominated strategies.
The timing of events is as follows (See Figure 1).
1. A competent and an incompetent candidate run for election. The nature chooses the
type of each candidate (congruent or dissonant) and the type of the majority (type-C or
type-P).
2. The majority choose between the competent and incompetent candidates.
3. The elected politician chooses e1 2 f0;1g, and the period 1 ends.
4. A challenger in the second election is drawn, and the nature determines the type of the
challenger.
5. Considering the observed policy choice e1 by the incumbent, the majority choose be-
tween the incumbent and the challenger (second election).
6. The elected politician chooses e2 2 f0;1g.
Note that the majority always vote for the competent candidate if the game ends at period
1. This is because choosing the competent candidate increases the majority’s payo by at
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least  > 0, and the probability of the competent candidate being congruent is the same as
that of the incompetent candidate. Therefore, there is no reason to choose the incompetent
candidate in such a case.
The re-election motive resulting from the second election can provide dissonant politi-
cians with an incentive to choose a policy preferred by the majority, and this incentive will
be dierent between competent and incompetent politicians. Since the majority can observe
the action of the incumbent politician before the second election, the policy choice in the
first period can be a signal about the type of the incumbent. Moreover, the result in the first
election can also transmit information on the type of the majority to the incumbent politician,
which makes the politician’s policy choice depend on the majority’s voting strategy.
Our interest is whether there exists an equilibrium where the incompetent candidate beats
the competent one in the first election where the two candidates dier only in the competence
levels from the voters’ perspective.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Second election
As mentioned above, the politician in oce in the second period will choose his or her most
preferred policy because the politician does not need to seek re-election. Hence, the congru-
ent type chooses e2 = 1, and the dissonant type chooses e2 = 0. Therefore, the majority
prefer the congruent type to the dissonant one if there is no dierence in the candidates’
competence.
Although the types of candidates are unobservable by voters, the policy choice in the
first period may provide information about the type of the incumbent. Since the congruent
politician always chooses e1 = 1, the majority can identify the incumbent as the dissonant
type if the incumbent has chosen e1 = 0.10
If the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1 in the first period, the majority update their belief
about the type of the incumbent by the following rule. Let i denote the probability that
the dissonant-type incumbent with competence level i 2 fH;Lg chooses e1 = 1. Then, the
majority perceive that the incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is the congruent type with the
10If the dissonant type chooses e1 = 0 with positive probability, this belief of the majority is consistent with
Bayes’ rule and the incumbent’s strategy. When the dissonant type does not choose e1 = 0, the information
set following e1 = 0 is o-the-equilibrium-path. In this case, we assume that the majority’s belief in this
information set places zero probability on the congruent type. This restriction will be minimal, given the
formulation that the congruent type never chooses e1 = 0. Besley and Smart (2007) make a similar assumption.
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following probability:
i =

 + (1   )i ; i = H;L: (1)
Note that i   with strict inequality when i < 1. On the type of the challenger, the
majority have no additional information and perceive that he or she is the congruent type
with probability .
The choice of the majority in the second election depends on (i) the competence levels of
the incumbent and the challenger, (ii) the policy choice by the incumbent in the first period,
and (iii) the type of the majority. The incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is not less likely to
be the congruent type than the challenger, and the incumbent who has chosen e1 = 0 is the
dissonant type with probability one. Hence, we have the following results.11
Remark 1. Regardless of the type of the majority, the majority re-elect the competent in-
cumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 and replace the incompetent incumbent who has chosen
e1 = 0.
In the case where the competent incumbent has chosen e1 = 0, the majority perceive
that the incumbent is certainly the dissonant type and face the tradeo between competence
and congruence. In this case, the incumbent cannot get re-elected if a competent challenger
enters the second election. If the challenger is incompetent, the electoral result depends on
the type of the majority. The type-C majority always prefer the competent incumbent to the
incompetent challenger; hence, the competent incumbent can retain political power even if
he or she has chosen e1 = 0. When the majority is type-P, they re-elect the incumbent if and
only if
  v: (2)
The left-hand side is the majority’s payo from electing the competent but dissonant in-
cumbent, and the right-hand side is their payo from electing the incompetent challenger.
Although the incumbent is the dissonant type, the majority obtain  from his or her com-
petence. On the other hand, the challenger is incompetent but is the congruent type with
probability . To focus on the interesting case where the type of the majority matters for the
electoral result, we assume the following. We will discuss the case where this assumption
does not hold in Section 4.5.
11Remember that the majority re-elect the incumbent if there is no dierence between the incumbent and the
challenger in the perceived probability of being congruent and the level of competence.
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Assumption 1. We assume that the policy-oriented (type-P) majority prefer the incompetent
challenger to the incumbent who is competent but is certainly dissonant:
v > :
Then, we obtain the following.
Remark 2. Under Assumption 1, the survival of the competent incumbent who has chosen
e1 = 0 is as follows.
 If the challenger is incompetent and the majority is competence-oriented (type-C), the
incumbent is re-elected at the second election.
 If the challenger is competent or the majority is policy-oriented (type-P), the incumbent
loses at the second election.
In the case where the incompetent incumbent has chosen e1 = 1, the incumbent is more
likely to be congruent than the challenger since L  . Therefore, the majority prefer
the incumbent to the incompetent challenger. When the majority are type-C, they prefer the
competent challenger to the incumbent. When the majority are type-P and the challenger is
competent, the majority re-elect the incumbent if and only if
Lv   + v: (3)
The majority obtain Lv by re-electing the incumbent and obtain  + v by electing the
challenger. Let  denote the probability that the type-P majority re-elect the incompetent
incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 in the election where the challenger is competent. Then,
from (1) and (3),  can be written as
 (L)
8>>>><>>>>:
= 1 if L <

1 
(1 )v 
+v ;
2 [0;1] if L = 1  (1 )v +v ;
= 0 if L >

1 
(1 )v 
+v :
(4)
Note that  is non-increasing in L. This is because a higher level of L lowers the posterior
probability that the incompetent incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 will be the congruent type
(see (1)), thereby increasing the majority’s incentive to vote for the competent challenger.
Note that the majority replace the incompetent incumbent if L = 1 because L =  in this
case.
Summarizing the above argument, we obtain the following remark. Furthermore, Figure
2 summarizes the re-election probability of the incumbent.
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Case (i): Competent incumbent
1
0
Case (ii): Incompetent incumbent
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Figure 2: Re-election probability of the incumbent
Remark 3. The survival of the incompetent incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 is as follows.
 If the challenger is incompetent, the majority re-elect the incumbent.
 If the challenger is competent and the majority are competence-oriented (type-C), the
majority elect the challenger.
 If the challenger is competent and the majority are policy-oriented (type-P), the major-
ity re-elect the incumbent with probability  .
For the later analysis, we derive the continuation value for the type-P majority at the end of
the first period. It depends on the competence of the incumbent and his or her policy choice
e1. When the majority is type-P and the incumbent is competent, the majority’s expected
payo in the second period is given by
V˜H (e1) =
8><>:
 + Hv if e1 = 1
q + v if e1 = 0
(5)
If the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1, the type-P majority re-elect the incumbent. Then, they
obtain the value of competence  and receive v with probability H . If the incumbent has
chosen e1 = 0, the type-P majority replace the incumbent with the challenger who will be
competent with probability q and will be the congruent type with probability .
Similarly, when the majority is type-P and the incumbent is incompetent, the majority’s
expected payo in the second period is given by
V˜L (e1) =
8><>:
qmaxf + v; Lvg + (1   q)Lv if e1 = 1
q + v if e1 = 0
(6)
In the case where the incumbent has chosen e1 = 1 and the challenger is competent, whether
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the type-P majority re-elect the incumbent depends on the magnitude relationship between
Lv and  + v.
4.2 The choice of the incumbent
Next, we consider the choice of the incumbent in the first period. While the congruent type
always chooses e1 = 1, the dissonant type faces tradeo between his or her preferred policy
e1 = 0 and the chance of re-election.
4.2.1 The belief of the incumbent
Although the incumbent cannot observe the type of the majority, the result of the first election
provides information about it. Let i denote the posterior probability that the majority are
type-C when the candidate with competence level i 2 fH;Lg has won the first election.
When the competent candidate has won the first election, the posterior probability that
the majority are type-C is given by
H =

 + (1   ); (7)
where  2 [0;1] denotes the probability that the type-P majority choose the competent can-
didate in the first election. Equation (7) shows that the voting strategy of the majority in the
first period aects the belief of the incumbent politician.
We say that the majority use a pooling strategy if, regardless of their type, they always
choose the competent candidate in the first election. In this case,  = 1, and H takes the
minimum value of .
On the other hand, we say that the majority use a separating strategy if the type-P majority
choose the incompetent candidate in the first election. In this case,  = 0, and the incumbent
can identify the type of the majority after the first election. Then, H takes the maximum
value of one.
When the majority use the pooling strategy, the information set following the winning
of the incompetent candidate is o-the-equilibrium-path. In this information set, we assume
that the incompetent incumbent identifies the majority as type-P because the type-C majority
never elect the incompetent candidate. Since the posterior belief of incompetent incumbent
also places zero probability on type-C when the majority use the separating strategy, the
posterior belief held by the incompetent incumbent is always given by
L = 0: (8)
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4.2.2 Competent dissonant incumbent
Here, we consider the behavior of the competent dissonant incumbent. Choosing e1 = 1, this
incumbent can certainly obtain re-election payo R. Choosing e1 = 0, he or she can obtain
payo r , but faces uncertainty about re-election. As Remark 2 shows, re-election occurs
when the challenger is incompetent and the majority assign the highest priority to candidates’
competence (i.e., their type is type-C). Hence, the perceived re-election probability is (1  
q)H . Then, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if and only if12
R  r + (1   q)HR: (9)
Let H  1  (1  q)H denote the increase in the re-election probability by choosing e1 = 1.
Then, condition (9) can be written as
H R  r: (10)
The left-hand side of (10) is the gain of choosing e1 = 1 for the competent dissonant
incumbent, which comes from the increase in the re-election probability, while the right-
hand side is the opportunity cost of choosing e1 = 1. Condition (10) shows that the competent
dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority
are more likely to be type-P (H is low). Since the type-P majority replace the competent
incumbent who is exposed as dissonant, the competent incumbent has a large incentive to
pretend to be congruent in such a situation. On the other hand, since the type-C majority
re-elect the competent incumbent regardless of his or her policy choice if the challenger is
incompetent, the competent incumbent who believes that the majority is type-C has a large
incentive to pursue his or her own interest. Therefore, a low value of H enhances the electoral
accountability of the competent dissonant incumbent.
Moreover, the competent dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when q is
large. While the competent dissonant incumbent who has chosen e1 = 0 has some chance of
being re-elected if the challenger is incompetent, this chance disappears if the challenger is
competent. Hence, choosing e1 = 1 increases the re-election probability more greatly when
the challenger is more likely to be competent. Therefore, the competent dissonant incumbent
has a large incentive to act in the majority’s interest when the challenger is more likely to be
competent.
As we discussed above, the posterior belief H takes the minimum value  when the
12we assume that the competent dissonant incumbent prefers e1 = 1 if he or she is indierent between e1 = 0
and e1 = 1.
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majority use the pooling strategy ( = 1). If the probability q is small enough and satisfies
q <
r   (1   ) R
 R
 q
H
; (11)
then condition (10) does not hold even if H is the minimum value . Hence the competent
dissonant incumbent always chooses e1 = 0 (H = 0) in this case. On the other hand, if
q  q
H
, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if the majority use the pooling
strategy.
The posterior belief H takes the maximum value of one when the majority use the sepa-
rating strategy ( = 0). If the probability q is large enough and satisfies
q  r
R
 q¯H ; (12)
then condition (10) holds even if H takes the maximum value. In this case, the competent
dissonant incumbent always chooses e1 = 1 (H = 1). On the other hand, if q < q¯H , the
competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 0 if the majority use the separating strategy.
Note that q¯H > qH because R > r and  < 1.
The following lemma summarizes the above results.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the competent dissonant incumbent is more likely to
choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority are more likely to be policy-oriented
(H is small) and the challenger is more likely to be competent (q is large).
 When q is suciently small and satisfies q < q
H
, the competent dissonant incumbent
always chooses e1 = 0, i.e., H = 0.
 When q is suciently large and satisfies q  q¯H , the competent dissonant incumbent
always chooses e1 = 1, i.e., H = 1.
 When q satisfies q 2 [q
H
; q¯H ), the equilibrium policy choice by the competent dissonant
incumbent depends on the voting strategy of the majority. If the majority use the pooling
strategy ( = 1), then the competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1, i.e., H =
1. If the majority use the separating strategy ( = 0), then the competent dissonant
incumbent chooses e1 = 0, i.e., H = 0.
4.2.3 Incompetent dissonant incumbent
Next, we consider the behavior of the incompetent dissonant incumbent. If this incumbent
chooses e1 = 0, his or her payo is r because the majority elect the challenger in the second
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election. Choosing e1 = 1, this incumbent has a chance to get re-elected. As Remark 3
shows, re-election certainly occurs when the challenger is incompetent. When the challenger
is competent, re-election occurs with probability  if the majority are type-P, and re-election
never occurs if the majority are type-C. Hence, the perceived re-election probability is q(1  
L) + (1   q)  L. Then, the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 if
L R > r: (13)
Condition (13) shows that if  > 0, the incompetent dissonant incumbent is more likely
to choose e1 = 1 when he or she believes that the majority are more likely to be type-P. While
the type-C majority always prefer the competent challenger to the incompetent incumbent
regardless of the incumbent’s policy choice, the type-P majority prefer the incompetent in-
cumbent to the competent challenger with some probability if the incumbent has acted in the
majority’s interest in the first period. Thus, the belief that the majority are more likely to be
type-P enhances the incentive to choose e1 = 1.
Contrary to the case of the competent dissonant incumbent, the incompetent dissonant
incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 when q is small. While the incompetent dissonant
incumbent who has chosen e1 = 1 can certainly get re-elected if the challenger is incom-
petent, the re-election is uncertain if the challenger is competent. Hence, choosing e1 = 1
increases the re-election probability more greatly when the challenger is more likely to be
incompetent. Therefore, the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a large incentive to act in
the majority’s interest when the challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
From condition (13), the probability that the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses
e1 = 1 can be written as
L ( )
8>>>><>>>>:
= 1 if  > 1q(1 L )

r
R   (1   q)

;
2 [0;1] if  = 1q(1 L )

r
R   (1   q)

;
= 0 if  < 1q(1 L )

r
R   (1   q)

:
(14)
Naturally, the incompetent dissonant incumbent is more likely to choose e1 = 1 if the type-P
majority are more likely to reward high policy performance by re-election (i.e.,  is high).
From (4) and (14), we can derive the equilibrium values of L and  as follows.
Lemma 2. Define q
L
as
q
L
 R   r
R
: (15)
Then, the equilibrium values of L and  are as follows.
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Figure 3: The relationship between  and L.
 In the case of vˆ > 1=(1   )
– If q is suciently small and satisfies q  q
L
, then L = 1 and  = 0.
– If q > q
L
, then L = ¯ 2 (0;1) and  =  ¯ 2 (0;1), where
¯  
1   
(1   )v   
 + v
;  ¯  r   (1   q) R
qR
: (16)
 In the case of vˆ  1=(1   )
– If q  q
L
, then L = 1 and  = 0.
– If q > q
L
, then L =  = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Figure 3 describes the graphs of the reaction functions L ( ) and  (L) in the case
of vˆ > 1=(1   ) and q > q
L
. The equilibrium values of L and  are represented by
the intersection of the two graphs. Lemma 2 states that L is non-increasing in q in the
equilibrium, which is natural as the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a larger incentive
to choose e1 = 1 when the challenger is less likely to be competent.
The policy choice is dierent between competent and incompetent incumbents, and this is
because of the assumption that voters cannot commit to re-election strategies. If the majority
could commit to punish the incumbent after e1 = 0 and to reward him or her after e1 = 1, both
the competent and incompetent incumbents would face the same decision problem. However,
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the majority cannot commit to who to vote for, and the electoral advantage or disadvantage
resulting from competence aects the electoral benefit of choosing e1 = 1. Thus, the incum-
bent’s incentive to act in the majority’s interest depends on his or her competence.
4.3 The first election
Finally, we consider the choice of the majority in the first election. When the majority is type-
C, they always vote for the competent candidate. The type-P majority weigh the candidate’s
competence against the expected policy choice to decide who to vote for.
By electing the competent candidate, who will choose the policy e1 = 1 with probability
 + (1   )H , the type-P majority obtain
VH (H )   + [ + (1   )H](v + V˜H (1)) + [(1   )(1   H )]V˜H (0); (17)
where V˜H (e1) (e1 2 f0;1g) comes from (5). Similarly, by electing the incompetent candidate,
who will choose the policy e1 = 1 with probability + (1   )L, the type-P majority obtain
VL (L)  [ + (1   )L](v + V˜L (1)) + [(1   )(1   L)]V˜L (0); (18)
where V˜L (e1) comes from (6). The type-P majority choose the competent candidate in the
first election if and only if VH (H )  VL (L).13
Lemma 3. The expected payos of the type-P majority, VH (H ) and VL (L), satisfy the
following properties:
1. Vi (i) is increasing in i (i = H;L).
2. VH (H ) > VL (L) if H = L.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 3 states that the expected payo for the type-P majority from electing the candi-
date with competence level i increases in the probability that this elected candidate chooses
e1 = 1. Lemma 3 also states that the type-P majority prefer the competent candidate if the
competent and incompetent candidates choose e1 = 1 with the same probability. Hence,
for the incompetent candidate to win, it is necessary that L must be greater than H : the
incompetent candidate wins the first election only if the majority face the tradeo between
13We assume that the type-P majority elect the competent candidate if they are indierent between choosing
competent and incompetent candidates.
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the candidates’ competence and their representation. However, the existence of this tradeo
is insucient for the type-P majority to vote for the incompetent candidate. In addition, for
the separating equilibrium to exist, the type-P majority must place a premium on the policy
choice: their policy payo (v) from e1 = 1 must be suciently large, compared with their
benefit from having a competent politician ().
Let us consider the case where the dissonant competent politician never chooses e1 = 1
(i.e., H = 0). The following lemma shows when it is optimal for the type-P majority to elect
the incompetent candidate in this situation.
Lemma 4. The relationship among VH (0), VL (¯), and VL (1) is given as follows.
1. If the policy payo v is suciently small compared with the benefit of competence 
and the condition vˆ  v(q) holds, then VH (0)  VL (1), where
v(q)  1 + (1   q)
(1   )(1   ) : (19)
2. If vˆ is in (v(q); v¯(q)], then VL (¯)  VH (0) < VL (1), where
v¯(q) =
[2 + q(1   )] + p2[2 + q(1   )]2 + 4(1   )(1   )[1 + (1   q)]
2(1   )(1   ) :
(20)
3. If vˆ is suciently large and satisfies vˆ > v¯(q), then VL (¯) > VH (0).
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 4 states that the type-P majority vote for the competent candidate regardless of his
or her expected policy choice when the policy payo v is suciently small. However, when
the policy payo v is suciently large and the competent candidate is expected to choose
e1 = 0 after winning, the type-P majority vote for the incompetent candidate if this candidate
will choose e1 = 1 with suciently high probability.
4.4 Equilibrium
We focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which the majority in the first period use
a pure strategy (i.e.,  is either 1 or 0). Hence, two types of equilibria are possible: the
pooling equilibrium in which the majority always vote for the competent candidate in the first
election, and the separating equilibrium in which the type-C majority vote for the competent
candidate while the type-P majority vote for the incompetent candidate.
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First, consider the case of vˆ  v(q), which is the situation where the type-P majority’s
payo of having a competent politician  dominates the policy payo v. In this case, the
condition VH (H )  VL (L) holds for any H and L (from Lemma 4). Therefore, the type-P
majority prefer the competent candidate in the first election, and the unique equilibrium is a
pooling one.
Next, consider the case of q  q¯H . In this case, the probability that the future challenger is
competent is high, and this situation suciently enhances the accountability of the competent
dissonant incumbent.14 Specifically, in this case, H = 1 holds from Lemma 1. Since the
competent politician is not less accountable than the incompetent one (H  L), the type-P
majority prefer the competent candidate in the first election (from Lemma 3). Hence, the
pooling equilibrium is the unique equilibrium in this case.
The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, there is a unique equilibrium in which the
majority use the pooling strategy if either of the following conditions holds:
1. The policy payo v is small, compared with the benefit of competence , enough to
satisfy vˆ  v(q).
2. The probability that a competent challenger runs in the second election, q, is large
enough to satisfy q  q¯H .
Next, we consider the more complicated cases that satisfy vˆ > v(q) and q < q¯H . The first
condition vˆ > v(q) means that the policy payo v is not too small, compared with the payo
from competence . Under this condition, VL (1) > VH (0) holds from Lemma 4, and hence,
the type-P majority would vote for the incompetent candidate if the political accountability of
the incompetent incumbent (L) is suciently greater than that of the competent incumbent
(H). The second condition q < q¯H makes it possible for the candidates’ competence to
negatively relate to their representation of the majority’s political preferences. Under this
condition, whereas the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with probability L  ¯ 2
(0;1), the competent incumbent chooses e1 = 0 if the incumbent believes that the majority is
type-C (H = 1) or the challenger is likely to be incompetent (q < qH).15
For the separating strategy to be optimal for the majority, vˆ must be suciently large, and
q must be suciently small. When vˆ is large, the type-P majority highly emphasize politi-
cians’ expected policy choices and, therefore, are likely to vote for the incompetent candidate.
14Recall that when the challenger is more likely to be competent, the competent dissonant incumbent has a
larger incentive to choose e1 = 1, while the incompetent dissonant incumbent has a smaller incentive to choose
e1 = 1.
15Note that vˆ > v(q) implies vˆ > 1=(1   ), which assures ¯ 2 (0;1).
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As q becomes smaller, L increases and H decreases. Thus, the type-P majority have more
incentives to vote for the incompetent candidate as q becomes smaller. When q is greater than
q
H
, the majority’s voting strategy aects H via the change in the incumbent’s belief about
the type of the majority. If the majority adopt the separating strategy, the competent incum-
bent recognizes the majority as type-C after winning. This perception makes this incumbent
choose e1 = 0, which makes the separating strategy more attractive to the majority. On the
other hand, if the majority adopt the pooling strategy, the result of the first election conveys
no information about the type of majority, and the competent incumbent chooses e1 = 1. This
incumbent’s strategy makes the pooling strategy optimal for the majority. Therefore, multiple
equilibria can arise in this case. The following proposition shows the conditions under which
the separating equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Moreover, we assume that q < q¯H and vˆ > v(q).
1. In the case of vˆ  v¯(q), the following hold.
(a) If q > q
L
, then there is a unique pooling equilibrium.
(b) If q  q
L
, then a separating equilibrium exists.
(c) If q
H
 q  q
L
, then both types of equilibria exist.
2. In the case of vˆ > v¯(q), the following hold.
(a) The separating equilibrium always exists.
(b) If q  q
H
, then the pooling equilibrium also exists.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When vˆ  v¯(q), for the type-P majority to vote for the incompetent candidate, he or she
must be suciently accountable such that L = 1. Thus, the separating equilibrium exists
under the condition q  q
L
. When vˆ > v¯(q), the majority’s emphasis on the policy choice is
suciently large, and the separating equilibrium exists even if L = ¯.
Figure 4 describes the parameter spaces in which each type of equilibrium exists, where
panels (a) and (b) correspond to the cases of q
H
< q
L
< q¯H and qL < qH < q¯H , respec-
tively.16 The vertical axes describe the range of vˆ > 1=(1   ).17 These graphs show that
a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist as q becomes smaller and vˆ becomes larger.
16The relation q
L
< qH holds when r is suciently large. The magnitude relation between qL and qH
depends on the value of .
17Note that v(q) > 1=(1   ).
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Additionally, the range of multiple equilibria extends as  becomes smaller, because q
H
is
increasing in .18
Summarizing,
 The policy-oriented majority elect the incompetent candidate when
– the majority place sucient priority on the candidates’ expected policy choice,
compared with their competence (vˆ is suciently large), and
– the probability that the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses the majority’s
preferred policy is suciently large, compared with that of the competent disso-
nant incumbent (L is suciently greater than H).
18The range of unique separating equilibria disappears when   (R   r)=R.
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 H increases with q (the probability of the challenger being competent), while L de-
creases with q.
 The incumbent’s policy choice also depends on his or her posterior belief about the
type of the majority, and the majority’s voting strategy aects it. Due to this relation,
multiple equilibria can arise.
 When the majority use the separating strategy, the electoral result reveals the type of the
majority. The competent candidate’s victory reveals that the majority is competence-
oriented. As a result, under an appropriate set of parameter values, the competent
incumbent never makes policy compromise to the majority, and this policy choice in
turn makes the majority’s separating strategy optimal.
4.5 Discussion
In Proposition 2, we asserted that the majority can elect the incompetent candidate, because
the politicians’ competence can relate negatively with political accountability. The crucial as-
sumption behind this result is that voters cannot commit to future voting strategies to replace
the incumbent who has chosen a policy that the voters do not want. Moreover, the assump-
tion that the voters have private information about their types makes the incumbent’s policy
choice depend on his or her belief about the type of the majority. Owing to this assumption,
the expectation of the majority that the competent politician may not represent their interests
can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the role of these assumptions. We show that the
above self-fulfilling prophecies do not emerge if we eliminate the assumption that the major-
ity can be dierent types. However, even in this case, an equilibrium can exist in which the
incompetent candidate is elected in the first election. This is because it is the voters’ inabil-
ity to commit to the future re-election strategies that leads to the negative relation between
politicians’ competence and accountability.
Consider that the majority are certainly type-P (i.e.,  = 0). Thus, they have no private
information. Under Assumption 1, which means that the type-P majority always replace the
competent incumbent if he or she is certainly dissonant, the competent incumbent can get re-
elected in this environment if and only if he or she chooses e1 = 1. This situation makes the
competent incumbent fully accountable (i.e., H = 1). Thus, the majority have no reason to
elect the incompetent candidate in the first election. Therefore, when  = 0 and Assumption
1 holds, the equilibrium uniquely exists in which the majority elect the competent candidate
in the first election.
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If Assumption 1 does not hold (i.e., vˆ  1=), the majority re-elect the competent in-
cumbent who has chosen e1 = 0 when the challenger is incompetent. Thus, the competent
dissonant incumbent can get re-elected with probability 1   q after choosing e1 = 0. There-
fore, the competent dissonant incumbent chooses H = 1 if q  q¯H and H = 0 if q < q¯H .
Note that this result also holds in the original environment where the majority can be of dif-
ferent types. The choice of competent dissonant incumbent is independent of the probability
of the majority being type-C if Assumption 1 does not hold.19 Owing to this relation between
q and H , when q < q¯H , the accountability of incompetent incumbents becomes greater than
that of competent incumbents (i.e., L  ¯ and H = 0). The dierence between L and
H becomes greater as q gets smaller (when q < minfqL; q¯H g, L = 1 and H = 0). Thus,
as with the previous argument, when the probability of the future challenger being compe-
tent (q) is suciently small and the majority emphasize politicians’ policy choices rather
than their competence (vˆ is suciently large), the majority elect the incompetent candidate
in the first election. Therefore, the equilibrium in which the majority elect the incompetent
candidate exists even in the case without the majority’s private information.
However, if the majority’s emphasis on policy choice is too great (i.e., vˆ exceeds 1=), this
equilibrium disappears, and the majority elect the competent candidate in the first election.
Thus, in contrast to the case of  > 0, the eect of vˆ on the majority’s demand for incompetent
politicians is non-monotonic in cases without the majority’s private information.
5 Empirical predictions and implications
5.1 Policy conflict
The incompetent candidate is elected when the policy payo v is suciently large, compared
with the type-P majority’s payo from having a competent politician (). While the majority
obtain the payo  if the politician is competent regardless of his or her policy choice, they
enjoy the policy payo v only if their preferred policy is chosen. Hence, when vˆ = v=
is large, the majority place priority on the politicians’ choice rather than their competence.
Then, in what situation does vˆ become large in real world societies?
A sharp policy conflict between the majority and other citizens (e.g., the rich) increases
the importance of policy choice and causes the situation where vˆ is large. When policy
conflict is large, the majority’s payo varies greatly depending on whether their preferred
policy is chosen or not. Policy conflicts are caused by, for instance, economic changes that
19We have imposed Assumption 1 in the previous sections to avoid the situation where the majority’s private
information plays no interesting role.
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produce disparity between economic winners and losers. Economic losers will require the
government to change the status quo, but economic winners will not.
Prediction 1. When policy conflict becomes more severe, the majority are more likely to elect
a less competent candidate.
Due to the recent progress of globalization, controversial topics such as immigration and
trade policy are becoming major political issues. In the United States, imports from China
have dramatically increased since the 1990s, and this new trade has increased unemployment
and decreased wages in regions with import-competing manufacturing industries (Autor et
al. 2013). Autor et al. (2017) show that the growing imports from China contribute to the
ideological polarization in Congress.
Our model suggests that these factors may be the reasons why U.S. voters have consis-
tently elected less-experienced candidates in presidential elections since 1996. Conflict of
interests caused by these factors has possibly made voters put candidates’ expected policy
choice before their credentials. In particular, Donald Trump’s win in the 2016 election was
largely attributable to the support from those who felt dissatisfied with the rise of global
competition and the influx of immigrants. Trump’s campaign pledges favoring protectionism
would be one of the causes of support from these citizens.
5.2 Quality of the challenger
The expected level of the challenger’s competence aects the behavior of the incumbent, but
this eect is dierent between competent and incompetent politicians. The expectation that a
competent challenger is likely to run for the future election is positively associated with the
accountability of a competent politician, but its association is negative for an incompetent
politician.
As a result, the expected quality of the challenger aects the majority’s choice between
competent and incompetent candidates. The majority is more likely to choose the incompe-
tent candidate when the future challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
Prediction 2. The probability that a competent challenger will run for the future election
enhances the accountability of competent politicians but undermines that of incompetent
politicians. As a result, incompetent candidates are more likely to win against competent
candidates when the future challenger is more likely to be incompetent.
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5.3 Value of holding oce
As in standard political agency models, our model also predicts that an increase in the re-
ward for holding oce (R) aects the voters’ welfare through both “incentive and selection
eects." While an increase in the reward enhances the incentive of the dissonant-type in-
cumbent to choose the majority’s preferred policy (incentive eect), this eort of pretending
to be the congruent type undermines the precision of the voters’ information obtained from
the incumbent’s policy choice. Hence, the incentive eect is harmful for the selection of
congruent-type politicians: the dissonant politician is re-elected with high probability when
the reward for holding oce is large (selection eect).
Moving forward from standard models, our model yields a prediction on the eect of the
politicians’ reward on the voters’ preference for the candidates’ competence. If the reward
for the politician is large enough, the majority prefer the competent candidate to the incom-
petent one in the first election. Large rewards make the dissonant-type politician choose
the majority’s preferred policy in the first period, regardless of his or her competence level.
This incentive eect eliminates the behavioral dierence between competent and incompe-
tent politicians, and hence, the majority vote for the competent candidate.
Prediction 3. When the reward for the politician is large enough, competent candidates win
against incompetent candidates.
This result is complementary to the existing theoretical literature that analyzes the eects
of reward for politicians on their quality, focusing on citizens’ entry decisions into the politi-
cal sector (Caselli and Morelli 2004; Messner and Polborn 2004; Mattozzi and Merlo 2008).
In these models, competent politicians can provide better public service but have higher op-
portunity costs of running for elections. Higher rewards change the balance between the
benefit and opportunity costs of being a politician, but whether those attract competent in-
dividuals into the political sector depends on the models. While Caselli and Morelli (2004)
predict that a higher reward increases the average quality of politicians, Messner and Polborn
(2004) and Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) predict the opposite eect.
Existing empirical studies show that higher rewards for politicians attract more compe-
tent candidates and improve the quality of the elected politician (Ferraz and Finan 2011a,
Kotakorpi and Poutvaara 2011, Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013). However, to the best
of our knowledge, no empirical research has examined our prediction that high rewards for
politicians cause voters’ preference for competent candidates.
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5.4 Valence and political representation
Finally, we discuss the model’s prediction on how the competence of elected politicians re-
lates with their representation of voters’ preferences. Since both the competence of elected
politicians and their policy choice are endogenously determined in the model, we cannot
use comparative statics. To predict the “ceteris paribus" relation between competence and
political representation, we alternatively compare the behavior of competent and incompe-
tent politicians fixing all parameters. Since the incompetent candidate can be elected only
in the separating equilibrium, we focus on the region of the parameters where the separating
equilibrium exists.
5.4.1 Political accountability
First, we consider the relation between competence and political accountability. We define
political accountability as the degree to which the re-election motive can discipline the policy
choice of the incumbent. We can measure it by the probability that the dissonant incumbent
will choose the majority’s preferred policy in the first period.
In the first period of the separating equilibrium, the majority’s preferred policy is more
likely to be chosen by the incompetent incumbent than by the competent incumbent. For
the incompetent incumbent, who has the disadvantage of competence, to get re-elected, it is
necessary to choose the majority’s preferred policy in his or her first term. When the param-
eters lie in the region where the separating equilibrium is possible, choosing the majority’s
preferred policy suciently enhances the re-election probability. As a result, the re-election
motive disciplines the incompetent dissonant incumbent, and the majority’s preferred policy
is realized with positive probability. On the other hand, the competent dissonant incum-
bent never chooses the majority’s preferred policy in the separating equilibrium. This is
because the competent incumbent elected in the first election perceives that the majority is
competence-oriented and his or her advantage of competence will dominate the next election.
Hence, the re-election motive cannot make the competent dissonant incumbent accountable.
If the parameters lie in the region where multiple equilibria are possible, the relation be-
tween competence and accountability is more ambiguous. When the majority use the pooling
strategy, the competent incumbent cannot identify the majority’s type. Hence, in contrast to
the separating equilibrium, the competent dissonant incumbent certainly chooses the major-
ity’s preferred policy in the first period of the pooling equilibrium. As a result, if q > q
L
,
then the competent incumbent in the pooling equilibrium is more likely to choose the ma-
jority’s preferred policy in the first period than the incompetent incumbent in the separating
equilibrium.
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Prediction 4. The relation between the incumbent’s competence and his or her political
accountability is as follows.
1. When the pair of parameters (q; vˆ) lie in the region where a unique separating equi-
librium exists, the incompetent incumbent is more accountable than the competent in-
cumbent.
2. When the pair of parameters (q; vˆ) lie in the region of multiple equilibria, the incom-
petent incumbent is more accountable than the competent incumbent in the separating
equilibrium, but is less accountable than the competent incumbent in the pooling equi-
librium.
The first statement in Prediction 4 is consistent with the hypothesis, called as the “marginal-
ity hypothesis" in the literature, that elected politicians who have won an election with a small
margin (i.e., electorally weak politicians) will compromise more greatly to voters, compared
with electorally strong ones.20
Contrary to this hypothesis, existing theories predict that electoral advantage makes politi-
cians choose a policy close to voters’ preferences (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Grose-
close 2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002). The models of these studies assume that candidates
announce their policy platforms before an election and can commit to them. The valence
advantage makes politicians choose policies close to the median’s ideal point because the
advantages become of increasing importance when the policy platforms among candidates
converge. However, this mechanism does not work in our model since we assume that candi-
dates cannot commit to policies before elections.
Bernhardt et al. (2011) provide a dynamic election model in which candidates cannot
commit to policies before elections. In contrast to our model where the candidates’ valence
can be observed by the voters before elections, they consider the environment where voters
can observe politicians’ valence only after they are elected. They show that elected politicians
with higher valence are more likely to compromise to voters but can win re-election with
small compromise. In contrast to their results, our model shows the possibility that elected
politicians with higher valence are less likely to compromise in their first term.21
Empirical findings on the relationship between political representation and valence ad-
vantage is mixed. Ansolabehere et al. (2001) show that incumbent politicians, who generally
20This hypothesis was initially proposed by MacRae (1952), according to Fiorina (1973).
21While politicians can be elected at most twice, like U.S. presidents, in our model, Bernhardt et al. (2011)
analyze the environment where politicians can be elected more than twice and show that the relation between
valence advantage and policy extremeness changes with politicians’ seniority: valence advantage and policy
extremeness are positively related among re-elected politicians because high-valence politicians can get re-
elected with small compromise.
28
enjoy advantage, are more likely to choose moderate policies than challenger candidates.
Stone and Simas (2010) show that the ideological distance between incumbents and their
district’s median opinion decreases with the competence levels of incumbents. On the other
hand, Grin (2006) finds evidence supporting the marginality hypothesis that legislatures
elected from more competitive districts (i.e., electorally weak legislatures) behave in line
with their constituencies’ preferences.22
5.4.2 Term-limit eects
In the standard political agency model, incumbent politicians choose their preferred policy
when they face binding term limits. Hence, whether term limits bind or not aects politicians’
performance.
The above argument implies that this eect of term limits can be dierent between com-
petent and incompetent incumbents. In the separating equilibrium, the eect of binding term
limits on policy performance is observed only when the incumbent is incompetent. In the
first period, the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with probability + (1  )L, where
L  ¯ 2 (0;1). In the second period, the re-elected incompetent incumbent chooses e2 = 1
with probability =( + (1   )L). Hence, the binding term limit decreases the probability
that e = 1 is implemented if and only if
L >
p
   
1    : (21)
While e1 = 1 is more likely when L is large, a large level of L undermines the selection
of the congruent type in the second election. This deteriorating selection eect decreases
the probability that e2 = 1 occurs. Therefore, policy performance becomes worse in the
second term of the incompetent incumbent when L is large. Condition (21) holds when
L = 1, which occurs when the future challenger is likely to be incompetent. When L = ¯,
it is satisfied when vˆ is suciently large since ¯ is increasing in vˆ. On the other hand, the
competent incumbent always chooses his or her preferred policy in the separating equilibrium
because elections cannot make competent dissonant incumbents accountable. Hence, the
competent incumbent chooses et = 1 with probability  for all t 2 f1;2g.
As in the previous argument, the prediction is more ambiguous when multiple equilibria
are possible. In the pooling equilibrium, the competent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 with
certainty and chooses e2 = 1 with probability . Hence, the eect of a binding term limit on
22As Bernhardt et al. (2011) suggest, this mixed evidence may be attributable to the fact that the relation
between valence and political representation is dierent between first-term and senior politicians.
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policy performance is negative for the competent incumbent in this case.
Prediction 5. The relation between competence and the term-limit eect is as follows.
1. In the separating equilibrium, binding term limits aect policy performance only when
incumbent politicians are incompetent. The eect is negative if and only if condition
(21) holds. This condition holds if the future challenger is likely to be incompetent or
if the majority place suciently great importance on the policy choice of politicians,
compared with their competence.
2. In the pooling equilibrium, binding term limits negatively aect the policy performance
of competent politicians.
6 Some evidence on the term-limit eect
Although rigorous tests of our theory are beyond the scope of this paper, this section briefly
examines whether the eect of term limits on incumbents’ behavior depends on their compe-
tence, as Prediction 5 insists, using panel data of U.S. states.
Many empirical studies have analyzed the term-limit eect. They generally confirm the
prediction of the political agency model that the re-election motive matters for politicians’
behavior. Besley and Case (1995b) compare policy outcomes in U.S. states where governors’
term limits are binding with those in states where term limits are not binding. Using data
from 1950 to 1986, they find that per capita government expenditures and taxes are higher
in states where governors face binding term limits. This finding means that the incentive
eect matters. In the political agency model, incumbent politicians behave to preserve their
reputation in order to be re-elected. When incumbent politicians cannot seek re-election
by term limits, they do not make eorts to decrease state expenditures and taxes for their
reputations.23
Extending the framework of Besley and Case (1995b), we examine how this term-limit
eect is related with governors’ competence levels. We use the data of Alt et al. (2011), which
23Besley and Case (2003) repeat the analysis using extended data from 1950 to 1997 and find that the term-
limit eect has diminished with the times. Alt et al. (2011) also use the data on U.S. governors to clarify
the incentive and selection eects, exploiting the variation in the length of term limits across states. They
find positive support for both incentive and selection eects. Using audit reports in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan
(2011b) find that mayors who can seek re-election engage in significantly lower corruption than mayors who
face a binding term limit. Since the result is robust even if they restrict the sample to the incumbents who were
actually re-elected, they argue that the observed dierence could not be explained by the selection eect that
more honest politicians tend to be re-elected and face binding term limits.
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extend the data of Besley and Case (1995b).24 The data cover 48 continental U.S. states from
1950 to 2000. We estimate the term-limit eect by running the following regression:
pst =s + t + 1 binding limitst + 2 experiencest
+ 3 binding limitst  experiencest + Xst +  st ;
(22)
where pst is a policy outcome at state s in year t, Xst represents a vector of control variables,
s is a state fixed eect, t is a year fixed eect, and  it is an error term. As a policy outcome,
we use both per capita state spending and total taxes. The variable binding limitst takes one
if the governor in state s at period t cannot run in the next election due to a term limit, and
takes zero otherwise. The variable experiencest refers to the governors’ years of political
experience before assuming the oce of governor, which represents the governors’ compe-
tence levels. The important dierence from the specification of Besley and Case (1995b) and
Alt et al. (2011) is the interaction term between binding limitst and experiencest .
Our main concern is the coecient of the interaction term. In the separating equilibrium,
the re-election motive aects policy choice only when the incumbent is incompetent. As a
result, the eect of a binding term limit will be observed only under incompetent governors.25
Table 1 provides our estimation results. Columns (1) and (4) do not include the interac-
tion term between the binding term limit and the experience of governors. All columns show
that both per capita government spending and taxes are higher in states where the governors
cannot run for re-election, which is consistent with the findings of Besley and Case (1995b,
2003). The political experience of the governors is not significantly related with the states’
policy outcomes. Columns (2) and (5) include the interaction term and show that the coe-
cient of the interaction term is significantly negative. This means that the re-election motive
of the governors has a greater influence on per capita government spending and taxes when
the governors have less political experience. Columns (3) and (6) control political variables
such as the party of the governor, the majority party of the legislature, and the presence of
divided government. The magnitude of the interaction term changes little even if we con-
trol these political variables, while the interaction eect on government spending becomes
statistically insignificant.
The observed behaviors of U.S. governors are consistent with the separating equilibrium
24James Alt; Ethan Bueno de Mesquita; Shanna Rose, 2010, “Replication data for: Dis-
entangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits",
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CVYCFY, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:5:XW+8WPE+VdKX38A/PlwAXA==
[fileUNF]
25The theoretical prediction on the sign of the coecient of the interaction term is ambiguous, as Prediction 5
describes. Furthermore, if multiple equilibria are possible, this prediction will change if the pooling equilibrium
occurs with suciently high frequency.
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Table 1: Term-Limit Eects and competence
Dependent variables:
Log of per capita spending Log of per capita taxes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Governor cannot run 0.0139 0.0277 0.0264 0.0181 0.0452 0.0474
(0.0071) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0106) (0.0166) (0.0162)
Political experience -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Governor cannot run -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0026
 Political experience (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Political control No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2400 2400 2352 2393 2393 2345
R2 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.943 0.943 0.944
Note: We include control variables such as the log of income per capita, the log of state population, the share of
population aged over 65, and the share of population aged 5-17. Columns (3) and (6) also control some political
variables, such as the party of the governor, the majority party of the legislature, and the presence of divided
government. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
in the model. The re-election motive cannot discipline competent incumbents because of their
advantage of competence and their belief that voters are competence-oriented. As a result,
the eect of binding term limits becomes weaker as the incumbent is more competent. Of
course, we cannot say much about the validity of our model from this simple estimation, and
more careful examination is necessary in future research.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model of political agency to investigate when voters prefer
an incompetent candidate to a competent one. In this model, the voters elect either a compe-
tent or an incompetent candidate in the first election. After the winner chooses a policy, this
incumbent contests the second election with a new challenger, and the winner of this election
again chooses a policy. The candidates are heterogeneous in competence levels and policy
preferences. While the voters can observe the candidates’ competence, they cannot observe
the candidates’ policy preferences. Even though the policy preferences of the elected incum-
bent conflict with those of the majority, the re-election motive may incentivize him or her
to choose the voters’ preferred policy. While the voters obtain benefit from the competence
of the elected candidate, how much priority they attach to the candidates’ competence is the
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voters’ private information. Some voters place the candidates’ competence above anything
else (type-C), while some others place lower priority on it (type-P).
The model shows that a negative relation can occur between politicians’ competence and
political accountability because the condition to making electoral accountability work is dif-
ferent between competent and incompetent incumbents. If the future challenger is incompe-
tent and the voters are type-C, then the competent incumbent can get re-elected even if this
incumbent has not chosen the voters’ preferred policy. Thus, the competent incumbent has a
small incentive to act in the voters’ interest when the future challenger is more likely to be
incompetent. Similarly, even if the incompetent incumbent has chosen the voters’ preferred
policy, it does not assure his or her re-election if the future challenger is competent. Hence,
the incompetent incumbent has a small incentive to act in the voters’ interest when the future
challenger is more likely to be competent. As a result, a negative relation between compe-
tence and accountability emerges when the probability that the future challenger is competent
is low.
The voters’ private information provides another mechanism leading to the negative rela-
tion between competence and accountability. This mechanism shows that the type-P voters’
distrust against the competent candidate can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Let us assume that
the type-P voters distrust the competent candidate for some reason and vote for the incompe-
tent candidate in the first election, while the type-C voters vote for the competent candidate.
Then, this separating strategy of the voters reveals their type to the winning candidate; if
elected, the competent candidate will perceive that the voters are type-C and place the maxi-
mum value on his or her competence. As a result, the competent incumbent pursues his or her
own interest while in oce, and the negative relation between competence and accountability
emerges. Given this behavior of the competent incumbent, the type-P voters’ distrust against
the competent incumbent is rational, even though it is groundless in the first place.
When the negative relation between competence and accountability exists, the voters elect
the incompetent candidate if they place suciently great importance on the politicians’ policy
choice compared with their competence.
Our model yields several testable predictions. First, an incompetent candidate is elected
when voters care more about the expected policy choice by elected candidates than their com-
petence. This situation occurs when there is severe policy conflict among voters. Second, we
predict that incompetent candidates are more likely to win an election when the expected
quality of the future challenger is low. Third, the chance of incompetent candidates to win
against competent candidates vanishes when the reward for politicians rises enough. Finally,
we predict that the eect of binding term limits on politicians’ behavior depends on their
levels of competence. In the separating equilibrium, the incompetent incumbent is more ac-
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countable than the competent incumbent: the incompetent incumbent abandons his or her
preferred policy to step toward voters’ preferences in the first term with positive probability,
while the competent incumbent always chooses his or her preferred policy. Hence, the in-
competent incumbent is more likely to change policies in the last term where he or she does
not need to seek re-election.
We use panel data of 48 continental U.S. states from 1950 to 2000 to examine how gover-
nors’ political experience is related with this term-limit eect. Empirical findings are consis-
tent with the theoretical prediction. The term-limit eect is stronger in states where governors
have less political experience.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The equilibrium level of L and  
 can be described as an intersection of the graphs of
L ( ) and  (L). The function L ( ) is non-decreasing in  , and  (L) is non-increasing
in L (see (4) and (14)).
Let us consider the case of vˆ > 1=(1   ). In this case, ¯ is in (0;1). When q > q
L
,  ¯
is also in (0;1) as described in Figure 4. Thus, L = ¯ and  
 =  ¯. When q  q
L
,  ¯  0.
Hence,   = 0 and L = 1. Note that if q = qL ( ¯ = 0), then L 2 [¯;1) is weakly dominated
by L = 1.
Finally, let us consider the case of vˆ  1=(1   ). In this case, ¯  0. If q  q
L
, then
 ¯  0 holds. Hence,   = 0 and L = 1. When q = qL, L 2 [0;1) is weakly dominated by
L = 1. If q > qL, then  ¯ 2 (0;1) and hence   =  = 0. Note that, when vˆ = 1=(1   ),
 2 (0;  ¯] is weakly dominated by  = 0.

Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We first show that Vi (i) is a monotonically increasing function. Substituting (5) into
(17), we obtain
VH (H ) =  + [ + (1   )H][v + ( + Hv)] + (1   )(1   H ) (q + v): (A1)
Using (1), it is rewritten as
VH (H ) =  + [ + (1   )H](v + ) + v + (1   )(1   H ) (q + v): (A2)
Hence, we obtain
V 0H (H ) = (1   )[(1   )v + (1   q)] > 0: (A3)
Similarly, by substituting (6) into (18), we obtain
VL (L) = [ + (1   )L] v + fqmaxfLv;  + vg + (1   q)Lvg
+ (1   )(1   L) (q + v):
(A4)
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First, we consider the case of L 2 [0; ¯]. In this case, since ¯  0, the condition (1  )v  
holds. Using (1), (A4) is rewritten as
VL (L) = [ + (1   )L]v + v + (1   )(1   L) (q + v); (A5)
and we obtain
V 0L (L) = (1   )[(1   )v   q] > 0;
where the last inequality holds from (1   )v  .
Next, we consider the case of L 2 (¯;1]. Similar to the previous case, (A4) can be
rewritten as
VL (L) = [+ (1  )L][v+ q(+ v)]+ (1  q)v+ (1  )(1  L) (q+ v); (A6)
and we obtain
V 0L (L) = (1   )[1   (1   q)]v > 0: (A7)
Finally, the last claim in Lemma 3 can be easily obtained as
VH () VL () = + f[+(1 )]+qvg  qmaxf[+(1 )](+v); vg > 0: (A8)

Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From (A2),
VH (0) =  + [v + ( + v)] + (1   ) (q + v): (A9)
Hence, for   ¯, VH (0)  VL () if and only if
  [1 + (1   q)] + q(1   )vˆ
(1   )[1   (1   q)]vˆ ; (A10)
where the right-hand side is decreasing in vˆ. When  = 1, the condition (A10) can be written
as
vˆ  1 + (1   q)
(1   )(1   )  v(q): (A11)
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When  = ¯, from (16), the condition (A10) can be written as
g(vˆ)  (1   )(1   )vˆ2   [2 + q(1   )]vˆ   [1 + (1   q)]  0: (A12)
The quadratic equation g(vˆ) = 0 has two distinct real solutions:
vˆ =
[2 + q(1   )]  p2[2 + q(1   )]2 + 4(1   )(1   )[1 + (1   q)]
2(1   )(1   ) :
(A13)
We define v¯(q) as
v¯(q)  [2 + q(1   )] +
p
2[2 + q(1   )]2 + 4(1   )(1   )[1 + (1   q)]
2(1   )(1   ) :
(A14)
Since g(v(q)) < 0, in the range of vˆ 2 (v(q); v¯(q)], VH (0)  VL (¯), and VH (0) < VL (¯)
when vˆ > v¯(q). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let us consider the case of v(q) < vˆ  v¯(q), in which the policy payo v takes an
intermediate value. In this case, from Lemma 4, the type-P majority vote for the incompe-
tent candidate if they are certain that the incompetent incumbent chooses e1 = 1 and the
competent incumbent chooses e1 = 0 (i.e., L = 1 and H = 0), and vote for the competent
candidate if L = ¯. When the future challenger is suciently likely to be competent, specifi-
cally if q > q
L
holds, then the incompetent dissonant incumbent chooses L = ¯ (see Lemma
2), and hence, the pooling equilibrium uniquely exists. When q  q
L
and q < q
H
, L = 1
and H = 0, and hence, the separating equilibrium uniquely exists. When q  qH , the policy
choice of the competent dissonant incumbent depends on his or her posterior belief about
the type of the majority, and this belief must be consistent with the majority’s voting strat-
egy. If the majority use the pooling strategy, then the electoral result conveys no information
about the type of the majority, and the posterior belief is equal to the prior belief. Then, the
competent dissonant incumbent chooses e1 = 1 (H = 1), which makes the pooling strategy
optimal for the majority. If the majority use the separating strategy, the competent dissonant
incumbent perceives that the majority is certainly type-C and chooses e1 = 0 (H = 0), which
makes the separating strategy optimal if L = 1 (q  qL). Hence, when qH  q  qL, both
types of equilibria exist.
In the case of vˆ > v¯(q) where the policy payo v is extremely high compared with the
payo from competence , from Lemma 4, the type-P majority vote for the incompetent
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incumbent if L  ¯ (this is always satisfied in equilibrium) and H = 0. If q < qH , then
the competent dissonant incumbent chooses H = 0, and the separating equilibrium uniquely
exists in this case. If q  q
H
, as explained above, then the policy choice of the competent
incumbent H depends on the majority’s voting strategy; H = 0 when the majority use the
separating strategy, and H = 1 when the majority use the pooling strategy. Hence, both
types of equilibria exist in this case. 
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